EPR: El grupo guerrillero más antiguo de México y América Latina.

 

 La historia del EPR

Al sur de México, en la Oaxaca de los años sesenta, a un pequeño grupo de jóvenes que por lamañana trabajaban como burócratas en la Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria y por la tarde formaban parte de la Liga Leninista Espartaco (LLE),
los sueños revolucionarios de la década se les metieron en la cabeza. Buscaron campesinos para asesorarlos en la lucha por la tierra, reclutaron estudiantes para tareas de agitación y empezaron la organización de obreros y colonos inspirados en los aires de la doctrina de liberación nacional, que por entonces recorrían América Latina. El triunfo de la revolución cubana en 1959 y la guerra estadunidense inicia

da en Vietnam en 1964 fueron el telón de fondo para la creación de su organización clandestina que, casi medio siglo después, continúa operando bajo el nombre de Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), el grupo guerrillero más antiguo de México y del continente americano junto con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).

En sus 47 años de historia, la organización político-militar que, en contraste con el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), fue definida por el gobierno del PRI e incluso por analistas independientes como “la guerrilla mala”, tuvo otros dos nombres antes de usar el de EPR. Los jóvenes que fundaron el grupo —en buena parte miembros de la familia Cruz Sánchez, originaria del centro histórico de la ciudad de Oaxaca— inicialmente lo nombraron Organización Revolucionaria Clandestina (ORC).

“Un poco más de historia”

Un extenso e inusual documento emitido por la Comandancia General del grupo, titulado “Un poco más de historia”, relata el origen y el transcurrir de la agrupación armada, cuyo histórico hermetismo le ha permitido seguir operando en el país, como sucedió de forma notoria en 2007 y 2008, cuando realizó una serie de actos de sabotaje contra instalaciones de Pemex sin que, hasta la fecha y pese a los amagos públicos del presidente Felipe Calderón, haya sido detenido uno solo de los participantes. En la acción exigían la presentación de sus militantes desaparecidos, Edmundo Reyes Amaya y Gabriel Cruz Sánchez, éste último hermano de Tiburcio Cruz Sánchez, fundador y actual líder eperrista.

Los otros fundadores del grupo armado, que hoy tienen poco más de 60 años, desde sus primeros días guerrilleros tuvieron como táctica relacionarse con la mayor cantidad posible de luchas sociales del sur del país, aunque desde entonces preferían permanecer detrás de los reflectores, “o sea sin aspavientos ni actitudes histriónicas, sin importar que los que estaban a la cabeza de sus organizaciones se llevaran el prestigio y las palmas”. Su objetivo era sembrar las semillas de la revolución al organizar el descontento que existía. El grupo comisionaba a ciertos militantes para estar en cualquier movimiento que surgiera, sin importar que fuera del Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), la LLE u otras organizaciones.

Uno de sus primeros éxitos dentro del mundo de la izquierda subterránea fue el haber impulsado la Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos (CNED), en Guanajuato, estado en el que, debido a la importante ascendencia de los cristeros, algunos dirigentes comunistas del Distrito Federal creían que no se podía hacer nada.

Sin embargo, el núcleo eperrista pudo hacer mítines, manifestaciones, recolectar dinero por medio de boteo y ayudar a que crecieran organizaciones juveniles de izquierda en el Bajío, algo tan sobresaliente como ver orquídeas en el desierto. En otros estados pudieron adquirir posiciones de influencia en federaciones estudiantiles, donde reclutaron a nuevos miembros que aunque públicamente se asumían como priistas les decían a los eperristas que ellos iban a transformar al PRI desde dentro, lo cual hizo que se ganaran el apodo de Los dentristas.

Los jóvenes guerrilleros viajaban por todo el país y se sumaban a luchas en las que veían la posibilidad de esparcir la semilla revolucionaria. El primer movimiento importante en el cual participaron fue uno acontecido en la Universidad Nicolaíta de Michoacán, donde pudieron establecer nuevos contactos en escuelas normales rurales y universidades públicas. En esos días, el líder Efrén Capíz fue aprehendido, por lo que los eperristas, mediante la CNED, organizaron una Marcha de la Libertad que partió de Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, en la que demandaban su libertad. Los manifestantes avanzaron hasta Valle de Santiago, donde el Ejército los esperaba. Los soldados se abalanzaron sobre ellos y los subieron a decenas de autobuses. Los trasladaron a cuarteles militares y, entre amenazas y cachetadas, les tomaron sus datos y luego los dejaron en libertad.

En esa ocasión, los eperristas fueron reprimidos no sólo por los soldados, sino también por sus propios compañeros de marcha, quienes los increparon por repartir las tesis de Ernesto Che Guevara entre los manifestantes. Tras abandonar la prisión, los jóvenes eperristas sostuvieron una reunión con la cúpula del PCM, en la cual los dirigentes se burlaron de ellos llamándoles anarco-castro-guevara-aventureros. La separación de los eperristas de los sectores de la izquierda más conocida (que hoy forman parte del PRD o apoyan al EZLN) comenzó allí, y se ahondó luego de Tlatelolco en 1968, cuando los eperristas ya eran catalogados como “ultras”. El núcleo se refugió en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), y trató de aumentar su presencia en las universidades de Oaxaca, Guadalajara, Morelia y Sinaloa. Cuando se incrementó la represión tras 1968, los eperristas tuvieron que dejar las universidades y se fueron a trabajar en pequeñas comunidades rurales, en muchas de las cuales aún cuentan con un respaldo que ha permitido que ninguno de sus dirigentes fundadores sea detenido.

Los setenta: Surgimiento de la ORCUP

En los años setenta, el núcleo eperrista se alió con otro pequeño grupo de nombre Unión del Pueblo, en el que había jóvenes que se pronunciaban por la lucha armada. La Organización Revolucionaria Clandestina pasó a ser la: Organización Revolucionaria Clandestina-Unión del Pueblo (ORCUP). En esta nueva fase formó el Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER) y enfocó su trabajo en repeler organizadamente a grupos paramilitares de la Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara (FEG) y en la creación de bufetes jurídicos populares para asesorar legalmente a campesinos. En ese entonces, en el mundo de la izquierda subterránea, los eperristas ya no eran tildados de “ultras”, sino como “policías de la CIA”. Un grupo llamado Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria (MAR) formó un comando para asesinar a los fundadores eperristas, aunque nunca lo consiguió. Ante la persecución gubernamental y la de otros grupos subversivos, los eperristas apuntalaron todavía más su vida clandestina: sus integrantes fueron acusados de ser miembros infiltrados del ORCUP, como si efectivamente fueran agentes enemigos pertenecientes a la CIA.

La Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, la agrupación más consolidada de esa década, determinó en su momento que los eperristas tenían que ser ajusticiados por ser una tendencia “campesinista” y por colaborar con la policía. Para revertir esto, los eperristas buscaron al dirigente de la Liga, Ignacio Salas Obregón, Oseas, con quien fumaron la pipa de la paz.

A la par, mediante el nombre de ORCUP los eperristas alentaron el desarrollo de escuelas populares. Entre los militantes más destacados que murieron en esa década se encuentra Joel Silva Aréstegui, apodado El Panterita, torturado, asesinado y desaparecido. Otros fueron Gastón Erudiel y Ricardo Pérez Hernández, muertos en diferentes circunstancias. Fue en estos años cuando los eperristas montaron la mayoría de sus escuelas de educación política militar, a donde asistían tres o cuatro organizaciones y grupos.

A finales de los setenta, los eperristas se reunieron con otro grupo de guerrilleros que habían estado al lado de Lucio Cabañas cuando éste cayó durante un enfrentamiento con el Ejército en las montañas de Guerrero. Aunque habían militado en las filas del grupo de uno de los líderes míticos de la guerrilla contemporánea en México, los integrantes del Partido de los Pobres desconocían lo que era un lineamiento político y el estudio de la filosofía marxista. De acuerdo con los fundadores eperristas, les dieron sus documentos para que los leyeran y discutieran un proyecto en común. Al final, varios de los guerrilleros campesinos se sumaron al núcleo eperrista.

Los ochenta: Nacimiento del PROCUP-PDLP

En 1981 se dio la integración formal de los colaboradores de Lucio Cabañas al EPR. Esto se dio a conocer en una entrevista con el periodista Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, de la revista ¡Por esto!, en la cual los eperristas se presentaron ya no como una organización sino como un partido. Así como aumentaba el número de sus integrantes, crecían las siglas que los identificaban: Partido Revolucionario Obrero Clandestino-Unión del Pueblo-Partido de los Pobres (PROCUP- PDLP).

Pero siguieron siendo satanizados. “Decían que no existíamos, haciendo eco de ello la mayoría de los medios de difusión conjuntamente con los articulistas; los que nos calumniaban no sólo nos difamaban sino también destruían nuestra propaganda en las manifestaciones, acusándonos hasta de sus propias desgracias personales; pero ahí estábamos”. En este proceso, los eperristas acusaron al resto de los miembros de la izquierda radical de oportunistas. “Muchos de ellos lo fueron y el tiempo nos dio la razón”.

Durante las insurrecciones de Nicaragua y El Salvador, los eperristas apoyaron no sólo con presencia sino también discutiendo con sus representantes sobre estrategia y táctica militar y política. Pero también exportaron a Centroamérica sus desencuentros con la izquierda. En El Salvador se pelearon con las Fuerzas Populares de Liberación debido al asesinato de Mélida Anaya Montes, la Comandante Ana María, y del suicidio de Salvador Cayetano Carpio, el Comandante Marcial, así como por el nombramiento de un miliciano de nombre

Los noventa: Surgiemiento del  EPR y las diásporas

A principios de los noventa, los eperristas decidieron concentrar sus esfuerzos revolucionarios en Guerrero. Militantes de distintas partes del país fueron enviados a reforzar la lucha que se daba ahí, y lo que encontraron fue una gran falta de trabajo político en las zonas rurales, así como violaciones sistemáticas de los lineamientos del grupo por parte del comisionado nacional y de un dirigente del comité estatal. De acuerdo con los fundadores eperristas, las comunidades no estaban estructuradas, las columnas guerrilleras estaban separadas de las comunidades y pocas familias colaboraban con ellos. Durante esta etapa se empezaron a dar choques entre los eperristas enviados y los locales de Guerrero, que de acuerdo con los fundadores fueron “resultado de una forma sociológica de ser y del nulo trabajo de formación política e ideológica”.

Pese a ello se empezó a levantar el trabajo y se fue desarrollando el lineamiento de la comandancia eperrista, a la vez que se organizó a pueblos enteros y se implementaron normas estrictas de clandestinidad. El primero de enero de 1994, el alzamiento del EZLN en Chiapas no tomó por sorpresa a los eperristas, ya que desde años anteriores los zapatistas ya eran conocidos por la base del EPR. Proletario, el periódico clandestino del grupo, se repartía en comunidades indígenas y, según los fundadores eperristas, fueron unos militantes de la organización los que derribaron la estatua de Diego de Mazariegos en Chiapas, conocido como el gran acto público que precedió el alzamiento armado de los zapatistas.

Como dictaba la línea original eperrista, el grupo hizo algunas acciones armadas en apoyo a los zapatistas con el fin de detener la ofensiva militar del Ejército mexicano, pero en los meses siguientes el subcomandante Marcos se desmarcó del grupo. “¡Oh, paradoja! nuestra solidaridad no fue bien recibida; tampoco nos quisieron, nos regañaron, y como perritos pateados, para no provocar un mayor ensoberbecimiento en su actitud, no continuamos, porque como siempre —y ya tendrán la oportunidad de leerlo en las entrevistas— a veces nos hemos pasado de... bondadosos”. Cuando los zapatistas convocaron a la Convención Nacional Democrática, algunos eperristas que llegaron a Chiapas no fueron bienvenidos. Se les acusó de lucrar con el nombre del EZLN.

Al año siguiente, los eperristas aceleraron el proceso de organización en Guerrero, luego de que la policía estatal asesinó, el 28 de junio de 1995, a 17 miembros de la Organización Campesina de la Sierra del Sur (OCSS), que no eran militantes pero que simpatizaban con la causa.

Poco tiempo después el grupo cambió de nuevo su nombre: de Partido Revolucionario Obrero Clandestino Unión del Pueblo-Partido de los Pobres (PROCUP-PDLP), se convirtió en el Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR). Algunos consideraron que era la oportunidad de intentar borrar la historia negra del grupo y estar en la cresta de la ola, en los medios, con los intelectuales, analistas y académicos; otros argumentaron que habían quedado en la orfandad supuestamente teórica desde la caída del muro de Berlín y de la URSS, y decían que no debía mencionarse la palabra “socialismo”.

Lo que sí acordaron fue el cambio de nombre, con el objetivo de “engañar al enemigo y para que el pueblo creyera realmente lo que estábamos planteando”. De acuerdo con los fundadores eperristas, se inventó que el EPR era la alianza de 14 organizaciones, cuando en realidad eran las estructuras del PROCUP-PDLP.

El 28 de junio de 1996, un año después de la masacre de Aguas Blancas, se hizo la presentación pública del EPR, y el 28 de agosto de ese mismo año el EPR lanzó una ofensiva fracasada en Oaxaca y Guerrero. Para justificar esta derrota, que provocó detenciones y represión en regiones donde tenían amplia base social, los fundadores eperristas literalmente dicen: “En el transcurso del desarrollo de los planes partidistas se empieza a descubrir que algunos responsables de los estados mentían porque —dentro de su lógica— según la cantidad de supuestos cuadros que tenían eran sus necesidades y las teníamos que satisfacer, se descubrió que algunos de éstos estaban satisfaciendo sus necesidades personales y que no vivían de una manera austera o como algunos otros compañeros que casi vivían miserablemente, sino que su vida la satisfacían con la francachela, amén de otras situaciones de corrupción. Eso va agudizando la crisis porque para esconder todo esto se amparaban en una supuesta posición política, por la facilidad que había dado el partido de ampliar el comité central, pero la mayoría de los integrantes no respondía a tener la capacidad ni la disposición de serlo, creyendo que al serlo iban a tener prebendas y desahogos económicos, pero al estar dentro del CC, ven el trabajo, el esfuerzo, la discusión y la disposición de trabajo y se amparan en una supuesta intención de horizontalidad para poder hacer, sin consultar a nadie, situaciones que se podían hacer, siempre y cuando participara la seguridad del partido (su inteligencia), y va haciendo cada quien lo que le satisface personalmente, violando principios hasta llegar a ‘ajusticiar’ a personas que creyeron eran policías”.

El fracaso de la ofensiva derivó en una crisis interna y en la primera diáspora importante del eperrismo: Jacobo Silva Nogales, el Comandante Antonio, abandonó la organización junto con otros dirigentes eperristas de Guerrero, con quienes fundó el Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI), el cual se quedó con el control de comunidades guerrerenses y oaxaqueñas. El siguiente éxodo importante del eperrismo empezó en 1999, cuando un grupo de los militantes mejor entrenados militarmente decidió crear una corriente independiente dentro del EPR bajo el nombre de Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria (TDR); pero en los dos años siguientes la tensión aumentó y el grupo, conformado por cerca de 50 miembros conocidos en la izquierda subterránea como Los Rambos de la guerrilla, dejó definitivamente el eperrismo.

Conforme ha pasado el tiempo, tanto el ERPI como la TDR se han acercado más a las posiciones del EZLN y el poder popular, al grado de que en 2006 anunciaron que se sumarían a “La otra campaña”. En tanto el EPR, en diversos comunicados emitidos en 2005 y 2006 y de cara a los comicios presidenciales, expresó un reconocimiento especial a Andrés Manuel López Obrador y se pronunció a favor de que los grupos guerrilleros estuvieran en donde están las masas. Pero una de las diferencias notorias entre los eperristas y la TDR es la realización de asaltos y secuestros como parte de la táctica guerrillera: mientras que los eperristas rechazan en sus documentos estas acciones, el grupo escindido las reivindica, e incluso se le atribuyó el plagio de Diego Fernández de Cevallos, lo que provocó que el último comunicado emitido por el EPR en 2010 fuera una crítica indirecta a la TDR por el uso de dicha táctica.

Gloria Arenas Agis, quien formó parte del EPR y luego de la fundación del ERPI, relata en el libro de John Gibler México rebelde —que publicará Random House-Debate en julio de este año— que la escisión eperrista se debió, entre otras razones, al discernimiento entre “grupo” y “movimiento” armados. Arenas, quien llegó al EPR como parte del grupo que trabajaba en Guerrero, equipara lo vivido por su equipo con lo que el subcomandante Marcos dice sobre el EZLN: “Uno llega de vanguardia a elevar la conciencia de la gente, y la gente se va a unir a ti, tú eres la vanguardia; tú vas a guiar a la gente y a tomar el poder. Esto choca con las comunidades indígenas y sus tradiciones de democracia comunal, y también choca con los movimientos sociales que han enfrentado asesinatos y desapariciones y que ‘siguen’ peleando sin doblegarse ante el miedo. Teníamos que cambiar nuestra idea de que los movimientos sociales son formas inferiores de lucha y que los movimientos armados son formas superiores de lucha; y teníamos que cambiar nuestra idea de que los movimientos armados iban a aparecer en escena para guiar a los movimientos sociales”.

Sobre sus antiguos aliados, los eperristas anotan: “La unidad fortalece, pero esa unidad es sobre discusiones, sobre argumentos, porque no podrá ser por rencores, y eso que nos han tratado de lo peor, porque también tenemos muchos compañeros asesinados, porque nuestros indígenas no desean que les paguen el maltrato o el racismo, ellos se han estado ganando un lugar con sus principios y con sus capacidades para que sean respetados, porque se han dado cuenta que no todos sus usos y costumbres son adecuados, que aunque hayan sido catequistos —como decimos entre nosotros— no son ángeles ni querubines porque no somos absolutamente puros, ya que estando dentro de un sistema como el nuestro, también existen los que se enriquecen a costa de su propia gente, abigeos y un sin número de actos delincuenciales porque se les ha hecho más fácil adoptar los vicios del capitalismo que luchar contra él”.

En uno de los tramos finales de su escrito “Un poco más de historia”, los eperristas, “la guerrilla mala”, destacan: “Violamos un principio fundamental de nuestro lineamiento político porque antes de tener una actitud ante el enemigo, valiente y capaz, debemos tener una actitud ante la vida, para transformar al mundo tenemos que transformarnos nosotros mismos en cada uno de nuestros actos de la vida cotidiana, y eso intentamos, y decimos intentamos porque el revolucionario solamente se sabrá si lo es o lo fue, hasta el último suspiro de su vida”.

Esta nueva guerra entre eperristas y sus antiguos camaradas podría añadir más violencia a la que existe actualmente.




Tomado de  http://www.expresiontotal.com/periodismo-digital/epr-el-grupo-guerrillero-mas-antiguo-de-mexico-y-america-latina/itemid-215

Psychology of Participation in Insurgency, by Steven Metz (análisis)

Editor's Note:  Steven Metz gives us a look into the psyche of insurgents, arguing that we fail to understand them due to our own preconceptions and mirror-imaging of western logics, ideals, and norms onto others.  What drives insurgents "is not political objectives, but unmet psychological needs," he writes.

    It's common sense: to make insurgents quit the fight or to deter other people from joining them, to understand their appeal, we must know what makes them tick.   This is easier said than done as we Americans face a mental barrier of our own creation--we insist on approaching insurgency (and counterinsurgency) as a political activity.  This entails a major dose of mirror imaging.  We are a quintessentially political people, but it is politics of a peculiar type, born of the European Enlightenment.  We assume that the purpose of a political system is to reconcile competing interests, priorities, and objectives.  From this vantage point, we see insurgency as a form of collective, goal-focused activity that comes about when nefarious people exploit the weaknesses of a political system.  It occurs when "grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest."[1]  The state cannot or will not address the grievances.  And since insurgency is political, so too are its solutions: strengthen the state so it can address grievances and assert control over all of the national territory.  The improved state can then return to its mission of reconciling competing interests, priorities, and objectives.
            Much of the world--including the parts prone to insurgency--sees things different.  Most often the political system is used by an elite to solidify its hold on power and defend the status quo.  Most insurgents do not seek a better political system but rather one that empowers them or, at least, leaves them alone.  People become insurgents because the status quo does not fulfill their needs.  This is a simple observation with profound implications.  It means that the true essence of insurgency is not political objectives, but unmet psychological needs (although political objectives may serve as a proxy for psychological needs as insurgent leaders seek to legitimize and popularize their efforts).
            While insurgency unfolds within a specific cultural context which causes much of the variation in it, basic human needs are trans-cultural.  While simplistic, the familiar Maslow's hierarchy portrays this:


Insurgency arises from a combination of two conditions: significant unmet psychological needs, and the feasibility of violence (via both attitudes receptive to it and the actual tools of armed action).  To grapple with this, a psychological conceptualization of insurgency would be more powerful and useful than a political one.
            This paper is intended as a first, tentative step toward such a psychological conceptualization.  It will focus on the most basic element: motivation--the things which compel an individual to become an insurgents.  I will first offer a few comments on my methodology, then a framework for visualizing insurgent motivation.  I will follow this with a series of propositions on the motivation of insurgents and, finally, suggest some implications of this approach.

Methodology
            A complete psychological conceptualization of insurgency would require rigorous and comprehensive primary source data from as many insurgencies as possible, preferably all of them.  This is, of course, unattainable.  There is some primary source data based on interviews by scholars and members of nongovernmental organizations with former insurgents and, in some cases, with people who could have become insurgents but did not.  I have relied on it as much as possible.  But even this data has a number of flaws.  First, the coverage is uneven.  There has been extensive research in Sierra Leone, Colombia, El Salvador, and Northern Ireland; some in Peru, Uganda, and Palestine; but little beyond the occasional journalistic report, insurgent propaganda release, or operationally-focused prisoner interrogation from Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, eastern India, Thailand, and the Philippines.  Today those conflicts continue, making scholarly research dangerous.  Often governments do not want to give voice to the insurgents lest it help legitimize their cause.
            Second, researchers rely captured or former insurgents.  These people are likely to portray themselves in a positive way and emphasize the extent to which they were motivated by legitimate and worthy causes, thus skewing the data.  Those willing to talk to researchers are likely to be the less committed insurgents so the data collected may not accurately portray the motives of those who elected not to talk (or who were killed in the conflict).
            Third, time may distort the memories of former insurgents leading them to overemphasize the idealism of their deeds.  As Stathis N. Kalyvas points out, "unsettled periods generate simultaneously a need for strategic non-ideological action and an ideological explication of these actions."[2]  There is a window of opportunity following a conflict when the available data is "ripe"--it is safe for former insurgents to talk frankly, but not so long that their memory has faded or become distorted.  All of this means that the available primary source data is the best we have but we must remain aware of its shortcomings.
            I must mention one other methodological note.  I have assumed that the motivational structure of insurgency is similar but not identical to other forms of violent action, particularly terrorism, but also including militia activity and, to an extent, participation in organized crime.  I thus use some information from those venues while remaining aware of the differences.  To take one major example, pure terrorist groups are smaller than insurgencies.  Participation is more risky.  Hence terrorism offers fewer opportunities for personal empowerment or enrichment than insurgency.  Both are likely to attract a cadre with similar motivation, but insurgency will also attract a body of followers, associates, and supporters with different motives.  As appropriate, I will make note of this distinction.

Visualization
            Five major categories of motives inspire individuals to consider association with an insurgency, associate with it, or actually join.  Based on Maslow's Hierarchy of human needs, three of them can been seen as part of higher order motivation: fulfillment, empowerment, and enrichment.  Two are lower order: social obligation and survival.


            Clearly we must deconstruct this if it is to make sense and be useful.  The primal or lower order types of motivation include survival.  People become insurgents to survive amidst chaos and violence.  They have little commitment to the political objectives or ideology of the movement.  Any powerful gang or militia could substitute.  As with inner city street gangs in the United States, though, individuals may associate or join as a means of survival but eventually be indoctrinated into the ideology of the group, thus developing a deeper commitment.
            The notion of social obligation operates in tribal societies where the traditional power structure remains important (in contrast to tribal areas where the traditional structure has broken down, leaving young males as "free agents" susceptible to recruitment by insurgents).  David Kilcullen describes this process in Afghanistan.[3]  Local leaders see the growing power of the national government (a process spurred by the United States and other outsiders) as a threat to their power and prerogative, and to their group's cultural identity.  To defend against this, some of them form alliances with Taliban insurgents and provided fighters.  So these individuals may themselves care little about the Taliban or its objectives, but become insurgents because of the social obligations incurred within their tribe and traditional power structure.  The same process unfolded in Iraq's Anbar province until 2006 when local leaders began to see foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda as a greater threat than the United States or the central government in Baghdad.
            The higher level motivations are more important, complex, and interesting.  They overlap but, in a general sense, people associate with or join insurgencies because they will gain power, gain access to money and other resources, or to fulfill needs such as a sense of identity, belonging, and justice.  The best way to describe this is via a typology--a cast of characters if you will.  I call them "the survivors," "the lost," "the thugs," "the ambitious," "the aggrieved," and "the idealists."  These are what German philosophers call "ideal types."  Real living, breathing, sweating, and bleeding individuals will most often have attributes of several types but usually can still be characterized as one or the other.  For this reason, thinking in terms of motivational types helps unveil the richness of insurgent motivational clusters.
            The Survivors:  The survivor is an insurgent who lives in an environment where it is safer to be part of an armed group than not.  The insurgency is the only armed group available or, at least, the most receptive and powerful one.  Research with former insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, for instance, showed that 88% were abducted into the movement as children and 42% of those who joined said they did so because they feared what would happen to them if they did not.[4]  Like criminal gangs, insurgencies offer both carrots and sticks--they protect joiners and threaten to hurt non-joiners.  Abduction is the "purest" method of recruiting "survivors."  It has become pervasive in Africa.  In addition to the RUF, Renamo in Mozambique, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, and the bevy of militias and insurgents in Eastern Congo have made extensive use of it.[5]
            In conflictive regions, particularly those which were economically weak before the outbreak of violence, insurgency and illegal activity often are the only ways to make a reasonable living.  Human Rights Watch, for instance, found that to be the case in Liberia.  Most of the insurgents which the group interviewed were "deeply affected by poverty and obsessed with the struggle of daily survival."[6]  The inability to provide for families was a source of anger and shame to young men, thus making them receptive to the only employers actively hiring: the insurgents and warlord militias.  In Sierra Leone, individuals offered payment in money or diamonds by the insurgents were six times more likely to join the RUF than local self defense militias even though doing so entailed greater risk.[7]  In the absence of material inducement, individuals were equally likely to join the insurgents or the self defense militias depending, in large part, on which group controlled the region they lived in (survivors exhibit a bandwagoning effect, tending to join the stronger group since that maximizes the near term chances of survival).[8]  In a survey of former Colombian insurgents, Marcella Ribetti found that many listed employment as a reason for joining.[9]  And, to make it even more attractive, the work was sporadically risky but not tedious or physically demanding (something one also sees with organized crime--witness "The Sopranos.")  This suggests that insurgency (and crime) hold particular appeal in cultures which do not attribute high esteem to the type of hard work associated with menial, lower level jobs (which are the type most likely to be created during a  counterinsurgency campaign).
            The Lost:  The lost is someone whose life is missing meaning, structure, or a sense of identity, and who becomes convinced that the insurgency offers these things.  The insurgency, in other words, fills a psychic void.  As with the military, involvement can simplify life for those overwhelmed by a lack of structure and with difficulty making decisions.  Life becomes simpler because the insurgent leadership makes daily decisions.  Jessica Stern noted this dynamic when studying religious based terrorist groups.  "What seems to be most appealing about militant religious groups," she wrote, [is that] whatever combination of reasons an individual may cite for joining is the way of life is simplified.  Good and evil are brought out in stark relief."[10]  This suggests that individuals who are psychologically with a low tolerance for complexity and ambiguity are prime candidates for insurgency recruitment (as for recruitment into the military).
            The need to belong and to create an identity is particularly strong (and problematic) during adolescence.  Adolescence "is characterized by feelings of opposition and resistance to authority and power structures in the family, at school, and at the state level.  In addition, it is a time when injustice and its unacceptability are strongly felt."[11]  It is also a time when young people have weak impulse control, a need for increased self esteem, and an attraction to idealistic commitments.[12]  This is the reason that adolescents form a major source of insurgent recruits, particularly for insurgencies such as Renamo, the RUF, and the Lord's Resistance Army that did not have a deep foundation of legitimacy or popular support.[13]  The insurgency becomes a surrogate family for those who have lost their real ones.[14]  Like all young people, adolescents are powerless but unlike small children, they find this grating, even intolerable.  "By belonging to a radical group," Post, Sprinzak and Denny write, "otherwise powerless individuals become powerful."[15]  In a study of the Oodura People's Congress--an ethnic militia/insurgency in Nigeria--Yuan Guichaoua found that 45% of the participants said that joining the movement improved their status and reputation.[16]  This makes adolescents perfect candidates for insurgency.  It provides structure and identity, filling psychic empty spaces.  This has both an individual and a collective dimension.  Peer pressure is vitally important for "the lost," particularly young ones.  Marc Sageman has demonstrated the crucial role of social networks rather than any individual psychological propensity in leading young men to join jihadist terror networks.[17]  This same process functions in insurgency.
            Anything which makes an individual "lost," separating him or her from their source of structure, meaning, and identity, increases their vulnerability to insurgent recruitment.  For instance, Jessica Stern notes that Hamas identifies potential suicide bombers by looking for someone who is "anxious, worried, and depressed," specifically someone who is young, immature, unemployed, and convinced that life is pain and he (or she) has lost everything of worth.[18]  Insurgents also find prisons, refugee camps, and émigré communities ripe recruiting ground.[19]  It was not coincidence that the September 11 bombers met as part of a culturally isolated Muslim community in Europe, or that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was won over to violent extremism while in a Jordanian prison.  They were lost and then found.  In a storm, any island seems safe.
            Similarly, some insurgent movements have found that exploiting religious themes helps attract recruits who are spiritually lost.  The contemporary Islamic extremists, whether affiliated with al Qaeda or not, provide the starkest illustration of this, but not the only one.  The Lord's Resistance Army did the same with a blend of Old Testament, Pentecostal Christianity and local superstitions.[20]  Many other African insurgencies such as the Mau Mau movement in Kenya during the 1950s wove traditional religious beliefs into their ideology.  The Guatemalan and Peruvian insurgencies utilized the mystical religion of their indigenous foot soldiers.  And religion was certainly a factor for insurgents in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and for the Jewish insurgents fighting against the British mandate in Palestine.  Even the avowedly secular communist insurgents of the 20th century understood the need for spirituality and developed an ideology which played the same psychological role as religion.
            Boredom also contributes to a sense of being lost.  In rural areas and urban slums, insurgency seems to provide excitement for those whose lives are devoid of it.[21] This theme appears over and over when former insurgents explain their motives.  Ribetti, for instance, heard it from Colombians, particularly from the female insurgents she interviewed who sought to escape the tedium of a woman's life in rural areas.[22]  Louise Shelley observed that youth violence and association with terrorism is often linked to "the glamour of living dangerously and the adrenalin flow that is associated with living precariously."[23]  States not susceptible to insurgency have proxies for youth boredom and the need for excitement which drains these impulses into less destructive channels, whether video games, violent movies, sports, or fast cars.  Societies without alternatives--particularly ones where the educational system has collapsed like Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and he tribal areas of Pakistan can see boredom be channeled into political violence.[24]
            The Thugs:  There are people in every society--usually young males--with a propensity for aggression and violence.  Insurgency attracts them since it is more prestigious and legitimate than crime, and has a better chance of gaining internal or external support.  It offers them a chance to justify imposing their will on others.  This is amplified when a nation has a long history of violence or major military demobilization which increases the number of thugs and puts many of them out of work.  In many parts of the world, whole generations have never known a time without brutality and bloodshed.  Sierra Leone is a perfect example of this.  The RUF emerged from a group of young people from the slums of Freetown known for their antisocial behavior.[25]  While this group sometimes provided violent muscle for politicians, it also served up the raw material for the RUF, leading Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana to label it the "revolt of the lumpenproletariat" (a word coined by Karl Marx to describe society's lowest strata).[26]  Thugs seldom create or lead insurgencies, but they do provide many of its foot soldiers.
            The Ambitious:  A large literature has emerged in the last decade focusing on "greed"--the desire for personal gain--as a motivation in internal war.[27]  Greed can be for material goods, power, or status.  Simply put, insurgency has appeal in a system where upward mobility is blocked for the talented and ambitious members of the lower classes--where the elite is impermeable.  Logically if a state develops other lest risky means for upward mobility, it can decapitate an insurgency.  This will never work perfectly.  Even in a society like the United States where the elite is extremely permeable and multiple avenues for upward mobility exist, there are still those who pursue illegal paths which appear easier or more exciting.  But the smaller the pool of talented, ambitious members of the non-elite available, the less the chances that an insurgency can coalesce and persist. 
            The Aggrieved:  Americans, with their political perspective on insurgency, understand grievance.  The primary fuel of the aggrieved is sensitivity to injustice.  They believe that the existing political and economic system, or specific government policies or practices (such as pervasive corruption) are unfair to some group defined by class, region, ethnicity, religion, or race.  Injustice must be punished and stopped.  The only way to do that, they believe, is through armed action since it cannot be ameliorated through peaceful means.  Such insurgents consider themselves victims and their actions defensive.
            Three things are important about this motivational type.  First, over time grievances can become transcendental.  This means that they are no longer the result of specific government policies or actions, but are based on the notion the very existence of the government (and the elite it is felt to represent) is intolerable.  The Palestinian and al Qaeda insurgencies demonstrate this.  It is doubtful that any change in policy by the Israeli government or the United States could satisfy them.  Only the total destruction of their enemies (and the existing power system) will  restore justice.  Often this type of insurgent borders on nihilism, concluding that destruction is a vital component of creation.  They are the Kali of the insurgent galaxy.  Second, the grievance can be personal or group based.  Personal grievances are particularly important in cultures with an ingrained sense of justice where group members (be they a family, tribe, or clan) have an obligation to seek revenge when one of their members are harmed.  Combined with a powerful sense of male honor, this fueled a large segment of the insurgency Iraq's tribal areas as family and tribe members felt compelled to strike at American forces when one of their own was killed, taken prisoner, or otherwise dishonored.  Finally, grievance is widely seen as the most legitimate and acceptable rationale for insurgency, so is often used by insurgents to describe their motives even when it is not the most pervasive or powerful.  But in a general sense, the more focused an individual and a culture are on justice, the greater that the aggrieved play in an insurgency.  If a population could be given the Myers-Briggs personality test,[28] those who score a hard "J" (for judgmental) would be candidates for insurgent membership (I myself fall into this category!).
            The Idealists:  Idealists are closely linked to the aggrieved.  But rather than being driven by the desire to end injustice by imposing revenge, they seek to construct a more just and equitable system.  Theirs is a New Testament world-view rather than the stern Old Testament mindset of the aggrieved.  While true idealists are rare, their ability to inspire and legitimize the insurgency gives them influence out of proportion to their number.

Propositions
            Rather than attempting a full scale theory or model of insurgent motivation, I will advance the idea by sketching a framework, combining a series of propositions with a visualization and typology.  Some of these propositions border on the self-evident but nonetheless need stated to build toward the visualization.  All could be tested with further research--call them propositions in search of data.
            Individuals who associate with or join an insurgency have multiple motives, sometimes even conflicting or contradictory ones.   This means that a counterinsurgency program which addresses one or even several motives which led an insurgent to take up arms might not lead him or her to lay down their arms.  It is extraordinarily difficult (but important) to identify the decisive motive within a cluster.  Sometimes even the insurgent themselves might not be able to.  Motives lower in Maslow's hierarchy of needs are more important to an individual, but easier for a counterinsurgency program to address.
            Motive clusters determine the form and intensity of individual's involvement with an insurgency.  Clusters which incorporate or are dominated by motives higher in Maslow's hierarchy will generate more intense involvement with an insurgency, possibly in a full time or leading role.  Clusters lower in the hierarchy are more likely to generate sympathy, support, or association.  It is easier to convince insurgents with lower level motive clusters to abandon the insurgency, or to convince individuals drive by lower level motives to resist association in the first place.
            Motives may be elaborate and complex, based on linear logic, but they may also include emotions, feelings, and perceptions.  Much of the research on insurgent (or rebel) motivation focuses on linear logic and rational choice.  This may, in fact, dominant the decision making of some individuals.  But it provides an incomplete picture.  Motivation is sometimes sub- or supra-rational, particularly when grievances become transcendental.  In an insurgency with a cross-cultural dimension (e.g. when the United States is involved in a counterinsurgency campaign in a non-Western culture), the logic of motivation may be translucent or opaque: logic has a cultural component.
            The motive cluster of an individual or group changes over time. Insurgent leaders realize that idealists and the aggrieved are most committed to the cause, but are rarer than survivors, the lost, the ambitious, or even thugs.  For this reason, they attempt to shift the motive cluster of survivors, the lost, or thugs to idealism through indoctrination and other solidarity building efforts.  Conversely, an insurgent who joins based on grievance or idealism may become jaded remain involved out of fear or simply because there are no better opportunities available.  In such cases, insurgency becomes his or her livelihood.  Personal gain is more important than vengeance or idealism.
            The motive clusters which predominate in a given insurgency change over time.  Insurgencies normally begin with a small cadre of the aggrieved or idealists; they then add the ambitious and thugs and may eventually incorporate the lost or survivors.  In a handful of insurgencies, the idealistic and grievance based component increases as the insurgent leaders find ways to shift more and more followers to these motive clusters.  In most cases, the idealism of insurgency depletes and it devolves into a criminal gang or personal militia with a political veneer, particularly since late joiners to an insurgency are more likely to expect tangible benefits than the early joining, more idealistic component.
            Control of a region also affects the motive cluster which predominates in an insurgency.  When an insurgency controls a region, survivors join as part of the bandwagoning effect (since joining is safer than not joining).  That means that an insurgency which controls extensive territory will see a larger role for survival motives than one that controls little or no terror.  The latter will be dominated by grievances and idealism since those inspire greater risk acceptance.[29]
            The vulnerability of an individual to specific motivations varies.  Vulnerability arises from several factors.  One is age.  As noted, the trauma and stress of adolescence makes that age group vulnerable to an organization that promises meaning, identity, and power, and promotes (or purports to promote) idealistic objectives.  Adolescents whose normal framework for maturation--the family or local social structure--have broken down are particularly vulnerable.  A traumatic event can also make an individual vulnerable to insurgent recruitment.  This can be something within the personal experience of the potential recruit such as losing access to education or a job, or having a friend or family member killed or arrested.  It can also be indirect, collective or ascribed such as a government massacre or the killing or capture of a respected leader.
            The role of traumatic events seems to vary from insurgency to insurgency.  Interviews with former insurgents in Colombia and Sierra Leone found few instances where specific traumatic events led to joining the insurgency.  In Northern Ireland, Palestine and, based on journalistic accounts, Iraq, it was more common for individuals to mention a specific trauma which led them to become insurgents or terrorists.  Local conditions probably account for this.  In Sierra Leone and the Colombian hinterlands, there was virtually no effective government presence so joining the insurgents was a less radical step for an individual.  Joining required little motivation.  In Northern Ireland and Palestine, there was an effective government presence.  This made joining the insurgents or terrorists more risky.  It often took a major and immediate personal trauma to propel an individual through their natural risk aversion.  And as noted earlier, any separation from traditional structures of meaning and identity increase vulnerability.  This includes prisons, refugee camps, émigré populations, or even attendance at a college or university when it separates the students from their families.
            Vulnerability can also be systemic rather than purely individual.  Societies in transition are classic examples.  The insurgencies of the 20th century normally did not occur in the most traditional and backward nations, but in nations that had begun modernization.  Traditional structures for meaning and identity had broken down, but modern ones had not yet matured.[30]  Insurgents capitalized on this psychological "unoccupied terrain."  Some of today's insurgencies such as those in Afghanistan, Nepal, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa unfold in societies where traditional structures have broken down but modern ones have not taken root.  This makes them vulnerable to insurgency.
            A history of violent conflict increases systemic vulnerability.  For a variety of reasons, it is easier to start the second, third, or fourth insurgency in a state than the first.  Violence has been normalized, shattering the normal psychological aversion to it.  The normal structures of meaning and identity are weak.  And, in most cases, the war economy associated with preceding conflicts had a lingering and distorting effect.  People remember how to smuggle, how to extort funds, and so forth.  In many cases, those who benefitted economically and psychologically from the previous conflict would like to regain what they lost.
            Prevalence and role of motivation clusters varies across cultures, especially way in which violence, justice, and authority are  perceived.  In cultures where violence is normalized through a history of armed conflict or respected due to a warrior tradition, the psychological barriers to joining an insurgency are low.  That means that the insurgents can easily recruit the lost, survivors, the ambitious, and thugs.  In cultures where violence is abnormal, the psychological barriers to joining an insurgency are higher.  This means that the bulk of recruits must come from the aggrieved or idealists.  In cultures which place a high premium on justice or where national authority is little respected, the psychological barriers to joining an insurgency are again low, leading to recruitment of lost, survivors, the ambitious, and thugs.  In cultures where the national authority is generally respected and thought to rule justly, the psychological barriers to joining an insurgency are high, forcing the insurgents to recruit primarily the aggrieved and idealists.

Implications
            I am not a social psychologist so any policy or strategy implications I draw from this foray into the psychology of insurgency are tentative.  But it does seem clear to me that if my basic assumption is valid--if insurgency results from the confluence of widespread unmet psychological needs and the means of violence--then counterinsurgency must both lower the utility of violence and provide alternative structures for meeting unmet psychological needs.  The central psychological concept for understanding insurgency is more expansive and complex than  grievance (which is the political expression of unmet needs).  It is alienation.  Counterinsurgency must be counter-alienation.  This means that a comprehensive counterinsurgency program must address all of the motive clusters.  It cannot stop at articulated grievances, but must also provide non-violent structures for identity, self discipline, empowerment, prestige, and meaning.
            It is relatively easy to derail any inclination which the lost and survivors have toward insurgency.  The lost need alternative frameworks of identity and belonging.  Survivors need a way to live other than insurgency.  The thugs are harder since even if prevented from becoming insurgents, they will have a deleterious effect.  Long term imprisonment may be the only solution.  The aggrieved, particularly those for whom grievances have become transcendental, and idealists are the most difficult because their motives are the least tangible and most expansive.  Luckily, these types are fairly rare
            Effective counterinsurgency must continue long after the insurgency appears defeated.  Like all violence, insurgency has lingering psychological effects.  Researchers have noted the prevalence of post-traumatic stress syndrome in societies emerging from insurgency.[31]  At a systemic level, counterinsurgents must remember that over time, insurgency becomes both a livelihood and a life style.  If the insurgents retain the life style after the insurgency, the state remains fragile and conflictive.  El Salvador, Peru, and Guatemala all demonstrate this, with many insurgents simply becoming part of criminal gangs.  Comprehensive counterinsurgency must, as far as possible address this.  And it must remember that former insurgents do not become gang members simply because there are no other jobs available (although that is part of it).  They do so because as insurgents they felt empowered.  They were feared (and, like American gang members and mafia, confused fear with respect).  They did not have to work long hours.  So if the counterinsurgency program is to prevent insurgents from simply stripping off their ideological veneer and becoming pure criminals, it must find ways to address the empowerment issue.
            Of course this is easier said than done.  But there are solutions.  One alternative system of identity, meaning, and empowerment is the military.  Ironically, militaries and insurgencies both recruit heavily from the lost, survivors, and idealists.  While it might seem counterintuitive, one of the most effective things that a state seeking to deal the final death blow to an existing insurgency or prevent a defeated one from re-emerging can do is significantly increase the size of its military to provide an alternative psychological framework for potential recruits.  The United States should recognize this and help partner states vulnerable to insurgency sustain a military that might, to us, seem unnecessarily large.  This one step is emblematic of the larger one we must take to be effective in counterinsurgency: we must stop thinking in purely political terms and understand the psychological dynamics at play.

[1] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 2004, p. 564.
[2] Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 46.
[3] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
[4] Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil Wars," American Journal of Political Science, 55, 2, April 2008, p. 438
[5] Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 111-121; Heike Behrend, "War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Servino Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1986-1997)," in African Guerrillas, ed. Christopher Clapham, Oxford, James Currey, 1998; and Paul Jackson, "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?" Small Wars and Insurgencies, 13, 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 29-57.
[6] Youth, Poverty, and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 13.
[7] Humphreys and Weinstein, "Who Fights?" pp. 448-9.
[8] Ana M. Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Rebelling Against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent Recruitment," paper prepared for the Mobilisation for Political Violence Workshop, Oxford University Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, March 17-18, 2009, p. 12.
[9] Marcella Ribetti, "The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts: The Colombian Guerrillas," Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18, 4, December 2007, p. 707.
[10] Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, New York: HarperCollins, 2003, p. 5.
[11] Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p. 3.
[12] Fusan Cuhadaroglu, "Youth and Violence," in Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Youth, ed. M. Demet Ulusoy, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008, p. 12.
[13] Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 4, August 2005, p. 613.
[14] Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone," Africa, 68, 2, 1998, p. 183.
[15] Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 1, Spring 2003, p. 176
[16] Yuan Guichaoua, "Why Do Youths Join Ethnic Militias? A Survey on the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria," unpublished paper prepared for the Oxford University Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, March 2006, p. 17.
[17] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. [17] Post, Sprinzak, and Denny found the same thing ("The Terrorists in Their Own Words," p. 173
[18] Stern, Terror in the Name of God, p. 50.
[19] The American approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan created immense prison populations and thus assisted insurgent recruitment by providing a concentrated body of "the lost."
[20] Lawrence E. Cline, "Spirits and the Cross: Religiously Based Violent Movements in Uganda," Small Wars and Insurgencies, 14, 2, Summer 2003, pp. 113-130
[21] Brett and Specht, Young Soldiers, p. 13.  Again, this same factor contributes to military recruitment--from the Scottish Highlands to the isolated farms of the United States in the Civil War, young men have long joined the army seeking relief from the tedium of farm life
[22] Ribetti, "The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts," p. 712.
[23] Louise Shelley, "Youth, Crime, and Terrorism," in Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Youth, ed. M. Demet Ulusoy, p. 137.
[24] The correlation between weak or failed school systems and gang activity in the United States also demonstrates this dynamic.
[25] Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," 615.
[26] Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat," in African Guerrillas, ed. Clapham, pp. 173-4.
[27] For instance, Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"; Paul Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, 51, 1999, pp. 168-83; Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War" in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David Malone, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000; and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 1998, pp. 563-73.
[28] The Myers-Briggs personality indicator is used by many corporations and government organizations.  It is simplistic--I use it here to suggest how psychology could be used to better understand insurgency rather than as a final solution.  The indicator is based on four scales: EXTROVERT - INTROVERT (drawing energy from outside or within); INTUITIVE - SENSING (drawing energy from a “sixth sense” or from the five other senses); FEELING - THINKING (basing decisions on personal information or on logic/rules); PERCEIVING - JUDGING (preferring spontaneity or organization).
[29] Arjona and Kalyvas, "Rebelling Against Rebellion," p. 12.
[30] The classic analysis of this problem is Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
[31] Dean Owen, "When Violence, Terror, and Death Visit Youth," in Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Youth, ed. M. Demet Ulusoy, pp. 52-66.




Tomado de  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/psychology-of-participation-in-insurgency
 

The Remilitarisation of Latin American Streets

The military was once a central pillar of authoritarian dictatorships
in Latin America. Now, democratic governments are relying on them to
restore law and order, bypassing failing police forces. This is a
high-risk strategy, policymakers need to ensure that civilian control
of militaries remain paramount.

In Honduras 'Operación Relampago', in Venezuela 'La Guardia del Pueblo' and in Bolivia 'Operación Ciudad Segura': armed to the teeth, the military forces are making their presence felt on the streets of Latin America. In trucks, tanks or on foot, patrolling every corner of major cities, they aim to reduce the unprecedented levels of violence in the region.

On the night of 17 March 2012 in the midst of a wave of assassinations and kidnappings and in tandem with severe drug trafficking activities, the Bolivian President, Evo Morales was forced to deploy 2,300 military personnel to support local police forces in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. This operation which is meant to last 90 days, is the latest measure in an effort to maintain order 'and neutralise insecurity' in the Andean state.

With this new strategy, Bolivia has joined the growing list of Latin American countries implementing military force to combat insecurity and crime. These measures constitute an ominous return of the army to an increased position of power, rather than a mere 'trend' with a 'domino effect'.   

Re-calling the military                                                     

Since the 1980's the entire Latin American region has progressively made historic achievements moving from authoritarian and repressive regimes towards democracies that have managed to return the army to their barracks under closer regulation and through democratic processes. 'The legal and institutional efforts of the past thirty years were to move and keep the Armed Forces away from the streets, concentrating their performance in traditional missions of national defence and use them only for extreme cases, particularly for internal security' explains Erubiel Tirado, expert on security from the University Iberoamerica in Mexico.[1]

Despite these efforts, the necessity to combat organised crime and to establish control of gangland strongholds has pushed the hand of several governments to recall the military to the streets of Latin America.

In Colombia, since the year 2000 the military has been used to fight serious organised crime and insurgencies. 'Plan Colombia' was meant to reinforce the military in the 'war on drugs' with aid and training from the US. The use of the military to fight an insurgency is nothing new in Latin America: in the 1990's this tactic was used in Peru to combat the Shining Path which had evolved into a drug trafficking organisation. More recently in Mexico, upon assuming office in 2006, President Calderón decided to intensify drug enforcement operations. The government initially sent troops into Michoacán and then cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, even ordering the police to surrender their weapons. The number of troops deployed went from 6,500 soldiers initially to 45,000 today.[2] Increasingly present in operations around the country, the military has been supported by the US through a security co-operation agreement know as the Merida Initiative.[3]

Faced with similar problems, and using Mexican tactics as an example, in November 2011, the Honduran Congress voted to change its Constitution to allow armed forces to be used for policing. In light of the 2009 coup that Honduras experienced, strengthening the military was a highly controversial and delicate decision, but having the highest homicide rate in the world (82.1 murders per 100,000 inhabitants) pushed the country to adopt these measures. Guatemala also followed the footsteps of its neighbours, with newly elected President Molina calling for the army to 'neutralize organized crime' only a day after his inauguration in January 2012. High homicide rates in Venezuela have also led the government to deploy the military into the streets, creating the 'Guardia del Pueblo' (guard of the people) to fight drug trafficking and increase crime investigation and civilian protection.

Even the regional power, Brazil, is turning to military policing. In November 2010, the military were sent into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro to capture gang leaders following a wave of killings. However, what was initially supposed to be a short operation is still in place today. The military have remained in the Favelas with a 'Pacifying Force' of 1,600 soldiers to maintain order and fight drug trafficking. The Government announced at the end of last year that troops would remain in place for at least eight more months.

With a few exceptions, such as Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, the Latin American paradox is evident: strong progress in democracy, civil liberties and economic conditions since the end of authoritarian rules in the 1980's, while at the same time, in recent years, the military which is still associated to the 1970s-80s repressions, has been sent back onto the streets to fight organised crime.

Divided opinions

In an eye opening statement, the President of the International Development Bank (IDB), Luis Alberto Moreno, pointed out a few days ago that in Latin America and the Caribbean, 350 people are murdered, on average, every day, six of the ten countries with the worst homicide rates in the world are in Latin America and 1/3 of the world homicides are in the region.[4] Thus, the common denominator to all of the regional military-policing initiatives in the region seems to be violence and homicide rates. This insecurity has increased public demands for improved security and protection, putting pressure on decision makers to act. A reluctant Evo Morales was forced to resort to the use of the military in light of street protests demanding him to take action. A risk faced by decision makers of not intervening or not reacting to public demands is more disorder: in many instances, due to a lack of policing and justice, citizens have taken these roles into their own hands, resulting in the lynching and burning of the perpetrators.

Another aspect of public pressure for the use of the military in Latin America is the lack of support and trust of police forces, often known to be rife with corruption and handicapped by severely limited resources. The Latinobarometro 2010, a public opinion study on Latin America, highlights that 31 per cent of those surveyed see corruption as the main problem with the police, 22 per cent the lack of personnel, 17 per cent inadequate training, 13 per cent shortage of resources. More worryingly, in Mexico, a study (Buendia & Laredo 2011) shows that only 7 per cent of the population trust the state police and 5 per cent the municipal police. Such mistrust has further strengthened the call for the increasing involvement of the more regimented military to respond to unconventional threats from powerful, transnational criminal organisations that the police are simply not able to neutralise on their own.

Joaquin Villalobos, a regional security expert, explains that drug trafficking organisations are violent, with no moral barriers and a strong corrupting power. He stresses that thinking this could be resolved without confrontation and violence is naïve: this enemy needs to be faced with all the power of the state.[5] Similar reasoning has also encouraged the actions of other Latin American state authorities who cannot accept losing control of parts of their territory to violent, highly organised and trained groups.

On the other side of the spectrum, criticism and concerns over the use of the military for civilian-policing have been voiced. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) stated on various occasions its preoccupation with the (recurrent) use of armed forces to preserve public order. The IACHR believes it is not legitimate to use armed forces for policing or preserving citizen security because they are not prepared and lack the capacity to deal with civil issues.

The worrying aspects of the militarisation are thus: First, handing over too much power and funding to the military and, second, the lack of training and preparation of the military to deal with civilian issues, which can lead to human rights abuses as reported by Human Rights Watch in Colombia and Mexico. In agreement with this, Elisio Guzmán, director of the Police of Miranda in Venezuela, reacted strongly against the government's plan to deploy troops.[6] Juan Battaleme, a security expert from the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE), recognises the utility of the military due to its capabilities and resources, but stresses the importance of maintaining proper control by the executive and legislative branches over civilian oriented military operations.[7]

A strategy here to stay?

The use of the military for policing purposes is spreading across the region as well as bilateral exchange of knowledge and best practices in military policing and fighting organised crime - a collaboration that Colombia and Bolivia recently embraced. It has also been seen that the initial deployment of the military on the streets in Latin America becomes either bigger or permanent as the increase of troops deployed in Mexico and the extended stay of forces in Brazilian Favelas.

Juan Bettaleme describes the Brazilian case as rather successful due to co-ordination and co-operation between the police and the military. Indeed, 83 per cent characterise their community's security situation as 'better' or 'much better' compared to a year before.[8] Similar results can be seen in Colombian and Mexican cities where homicide rates have fallen. Medellin for example, once the deadliest city in the world, experienced the 'Medellin Miracle' (drop of crime by 77 per cent since 1991) following 'Operación Orión' in 2002 which was accompanied by social and reinsertion programmes.[9]

However, the use of the military to fight crime can also have serious consequences. An obvious example is the situation in Mexico where the deployment of troops has led to an escalation of violence leading to 47,515 deaths over the past five years.^[10] Moreover, drug cartels are still in control of many areas of the country, contesting the effectiveness of the military use. Surprisingly, despite five years of extreme violence and mixed results, 2011 polls (Pew Global) suggest that 84 per cent of Mexicans endorse the use of the military to fight drug traffickers. This demonstrates the amplitude of the security problems in Latin America, both in terms of the 'enemy' that the states are fighting and the weakness of their security institutions such as the police and the judiciary system.

Given the re-emerging trends in recent months and the spread of criminal organisations in the region, the use of the military for policing is likely to continue. It is seen as an effective tool for stabilisation that helps overcome police weaknesses and respond to public demands. However, the risks associated to the use of a state's legitimate last resort measure are its immediate exposure, the structural deterioration of its professionalism and the possible delegitimisation by the population, states Erubiel Tirado. Despite a growing concern of this practice in a civilian context, it has nevertheless gathered momentum and strong public support, thus legitimising it, at least for the time being. Crime and insecurity need to be tackled at their root.States should, therefore,  increasingly include security operations with personnel professionally trained on citizens' protection as part of a comprehensive strategy, accompanied by investment in social programmes and infrastructure as the Brazilian example successfully demonstrates.

Tomado de https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F7477C049F92/#.VUUE5EKCOrU