Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta ISIS. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta ISIS. Mostrar todas las entradas

domingo, 31 de mayo de 2015

"Al-Qaeda 3.0": Fusion of Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare

As war escalates between the United States and its allies against ISIS, we should understand why ISIS is so significant and how it attempts to terrorize with political message making. This is especially important within the context of the beheadings of American reporters James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and the recent threat in Australia to conduct mass decapitations in solidarity with ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria.

The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is part of what scholars at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have called "Jihad 3.0." The evolution of ISIS showcases the importance of the terrorist group "splintering" and "spinoff" processes that produce new strains of terrorist groups oftentimes associated with lethal assaults and copious bloodletting as they try to make a name for themselves and essentially compete with other terrorist groups for status, funding, and recruits in ways that closely parallel market dynamics.

The rationale here is that what Bruce Hoffman calls "al-Qaeda central" that was decimated in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in December 2001 and in Pakistan is "Jihad 1.0." Presumably, the emergence of al-Qaeda "affiliate groups" such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, constituted "Jihad 2.0. it follows that "splinter groups" such as the AQIM derivative, the "Battalion of Blood" that is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar would comprise a "Jihad 2.5." In turn, ISIS signifies the emergence of what CSIS experts call "Jihad 3.0" but at a recent CSIS symposium, neither Juan C. Zarate, one time national security advisor to president George W. Bush nor Jon B. Alterman attempted to define what "Jihad 3.0" means.

The distinguishing characteristics of "Jihad 3.0" are primarily threefold: first, is the fusion of guerrilla warfare, with its almost singular focus on efforts to take and hold land and simultaneously to win the "hearts and minds," of the populace by means of terrorism. While the use of terror by guerrilla organizations is neither a new nor original idea, the wide-spread, systematic, and seemingly predominant use of terror as a pacification method seems to be a watershed event in the modern terrorism experience. 

Second, is the refined "follow-up" capacity of the terrorist group to exploit marginalized elements of the ancient regime and integrate those elements into its structure. Scripted accounts report that ISIS forces have in some cases, been trained by former Sunni Baathist military officers who are themselves infuriated by the systemic discrimination against Sunnis experienced under the Nouri al-Maliki government. It is possible that in addition to kinetic warfare, those acquired skills might include cybercrime and even cyber war capabilities. Still another reason why ISIS connections to former Iraqi military officers is noteworthy is because those highlight the importance of political, religious, and historical "contextual factors" that help fashion the constituency groups critical to guerilla warfare and terrorist group success. In turn, those constituency groups help to determine the attributes of terrorist assaults as Rosemary Harris suggests in her work ("Anthropological Views on 'Violence' in Northern Ireland").

Third, ISIS demonstrates a more profound understanding the Internet and its value and other "social media" platforms than did its predecessors. In a thoughtfully written article in the New York Times, David Carr reports that ISIS films are the modern equivalent of "drawing and Quartering" for mass effect ("Medieval Message, Modern Delivery," New York Times, September 8, 2013, B-1, B-4) and his is right that the red jumpsuits ISIS victims wear before decapitation reflect and ISIS morality tale: the "role reversal" in Carr's words, of terrorist once imprisoned in places like Camp X-Ray now relish their role as captors. In contrast what is consistent with this new strain of al-Qaeda with what has come before, its is reliance on independent finances that have their origins in a multiplicity of sources.

What these ISIS films reflect is what I have called the "esthetic component" of terrorism, where extremely stark and graphic images of violence are used to strengthen, uplift, and essentially empower terrorist perpetrators, while the target population, what Martha Crenshaw would call the "secondary audience," is simultaneously denigrated, emasculated, and made powerless to control events. The end result of this is abject fear and other similar sentiments for the victims. In addition to the more proximate visceral reactions to the brutality of the event, what videoed terrorist events attempt is to inflict deeper psychological disruption on target populations by conjuring up historical and cultural references to the powerlessness of ethnic and racial groups.

This "historical reading" of terrorism is a powerful undercurrent or riptide to the act itself. Perhaps the most vivid example was the murder of Leon Klinghoffer in 1985 on board the Achille Lauro. That terrorist event evoked the deepest reaction in the Jewish community because the killing of a helpless, elderly wheel chair bound Jewish man, killed only because he was Jewish, tapped into the deepest feelings about the tragic historical legacy of the Jewish people.

Another problem with this CSIS event was that while experts did talk about the importance of an American strategic approach to combat ISIS, there was little if any in the ways of specifics offered. First, what American policymakers must do is isolate and identify differences in Syrian and Iranian national interest objectives that conflict and work to exploit them. If U.S. policymakers can develop a "triangular relationship" between the United States, Syria, and Iran in the "short-run and perhaps "middle-run" time frames, it can play off the national interests of Syrian and Iranian leadership putting a wedge between both Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rohani and Bashar al-Assad that would allow the policymakers to disrupt political, economic and materiel flows between those two countries that would give the U.S. policymakers flexibility and maneuverability to fight ISIS. In the case of Iran, it would be prudent to employ what David A. Baldwin describes as "positive inducements," coupled with negative sanctions to compel Iranian leaders to more readily conform to American foreign policy objectives Those efforts would perhaps also work to disrupt Iran's continued support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Moreover, such efforts would also signal a new engagement with Iran where their status in the Middle East is recognized at some level; that might have its own positive spillover effects.

Clearly an understanding of what constitute al-Qaeda 3.0 and what methods they use to achieve particular objectives contributes to our fight against ISIS. American leaders need to identify a set of Iranian and Syrian national interests that conflict with each other as the basis for a policy that manipulates those interests to our advantage. For the rest of us, we need to understand the "esthetic component" of terrorism and what it attempts to accomplish for these images of murder are in fact terrorist events in their own right. If political leaders and the American populace can work on those areas respectively, those efforts are a good first step in our fight against ISIS.



Tomado de http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-richard-chasdi/alqaeda-30-fusion-of-terr_b_5923264.html

sábado, 9 de mayo de 2015

UN says '25,000 foreign fighters' joined Islamist militants

It said the number of foreign fighters worldwide had soared by 71% between the middle of 2014 and March 2015.

Syria and Iraq were by far the biggest destinations and had become a "finishing school for extremists".

It also said if IS were defeated in Syria and Iraq, the foreign fighters could be scattered across the world.

Social media

The UN Security Council had asked experts six months ago to investigate the threat from foreign fighters joining Islamic State and other militant groups.

In the report filed to the council late last month, the experts say the flow of foreign fighters has risen from a few thousand a decade ago and is now "higher than it has ever been historically".

A member loyal to IS waves a flag in Iraq on 29 June 2014.
Defeating IS in Syria and Iraq could have the unintended consequence of scattering fighters elsewhere

They say: "For the thousands of [foreign fighters] who travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq... they live and work in a veritable 'international finishing school' for extremists, as was the case in Afghanistan during the 1990s."

Syria and Iraq were said to house 22,000 foreign fighters, with 6,500 in Afghanistan and hundreds in Yemen, Libya, Pakistan and Somalia.

line

Foreign fighter case studies

Texan Michael Wolfe, 23, planned to fly to Turkey via Iceland and then get into Syria to commit "violent jihad". But he unknowingly relied on an undercover FBI agent for travel advice, was arrested and admitted attempting to provide material support to terrorists.

Embarking on a path to jihad

Melbourne schoolboy Jake Bilardi travelled to fight with IS and reportedly died in a suicide attack in Iraq this year. The 18-year-old Muslim convert left Australia last year and flew via Turkey to Iraq.

Who are Australia's radicalised Muslims?

Briton David Souaan was jailed in December 2014 for preparing terrorist acts. Arrested at Heathrow last May after a tip-off from fellow students. Had previously been in Syria and had pictures of himself posing with guns.

Tracking UK's jihadists

line

A high number of foreign fighters had come from Tunisia, Morocco, France and Russia but there has also been an increase from the Maldives, Finland and Trinidad and Tobago.

The report called for greater intelligence sharing between nations to help identify foreign fighters.

It highlighted the effect of social media networks which had linked "diverse foreign fighters from different communities across the globe".

The chances of foreign travellers becoming caught up in terrorist incidents was "growing, particularly with attacks targeting hotels, public spaces and venues".

The Security Council adopted a resolution in September demanding all states make it a serious criminal offence for their citizens to travel abroad to fight with militants, or to recruit and fund others to do so.

domingo, 3 de mayo de 2015

The ISIS Beheading Narrative (análisis)



by Doyle Quiggle

  In this article, I apply Jonathan Matusitz’s insights from Symbolism in Terrorism to identify and isolate the plotline of the ISIS beheading narrative.[i]  If we want to undermine and neutralize ISIS internet recruitment propaganda (the E-jihad), then we need to understand how and why their symbols appeal to their target audience. Narratives kick symbols into motion.  ISIS are excellent narrators. We must find ways to counter-narrate and neutralize their group-forming narratives.

 

 

Qu’ran 47:4: “When you encounter the unbelievers on the battlefield, strike off their heads until you have crushed them completely; then bind the prisoners tightly.”
Because ISIS communicators legitimize beheading by reference to Islamic history and Islamic theology, local Islamic authorities who do not share ISIS’s interpretation of Sura 47:4 will need to take careful heed of how ISIS have made beheading into a powerful symbol and narrative of their jihad. [ii]

Beheading an enemy, an Islamic terrorist symbolically links his (increasingly her) Jihad today to the sword-driven rise of Medieval Islamic Empire and to the late Medieval and Early Renaissance blood-soaked contest between Christendom and Islam for control of Europe.

A symbolic connection is made objectively visible in the beheading by the use of the most important Islamic Salafic weapon—the sword. Therefore, to understand the full symbolic energies of Islamic beheadings today, we must also understand the past symbolism of swords and blood in Islam. Here, I will introduce only the symbolic structure of the ISIS beheading narrative.[iii]
Timothy Furnish, a leading scholar of Islamic beheadings, notes:
“Islam is the only major world religion today that is cited both by state and non-state actors to legitimise beheadings…In contradiction to the assertions of apologists, both Muslim and non-Muslim, these beheadings are not simply a brutal method of drawing attention to the Islamist political agenda and weakening an opponent’s will to fight. Zarqawi and other Islamists who practise decapitation believe that God has ordained them to obliterate their enemies in this manner.” [iv]
The ISIS beheading narrative derives its moral, legal, and theological authority directly from Islam. [v]   But it swipes some of its aesthetic appeal from non-Islamic sources, such as comic books, film, and video games. These non-Islamic sources have long circulated images of beheading in popular culture and have kept decapitation actively present in the visual fields and cultural imaginations of potential ISIS recruits, especially of gamers. 

Biologically, neurologically, and anthropologically understood, narrative performs the primary social function of creating cohesion and cooperation among in-group members. Creating cohesion and cooperation and activating the altruistic pre-adaptations of group members is why we evolved narrative as a primary social tool of our species. 

Out of the feeling of cohesion created by shared narrative there emerges powerful, neurologically compulsive feelings of reciprocal altruism, commitment to the group—trust. Neurologically, we encode narrative-induced cohesion-trust as courage. And courage is as indispensable a virtue to small hunting parties on the ancient Savannah as it is to SF operators storming a qalat compound in Afghanistan or to ISIS fighters in Iraq.[vi]

The ISIS beheading narrative performs all primary, primal social tasks for group members, beginning as communal blood ritual and ending as a personal trophy that increases a member’s sense of pride in his group membership.     

The Beheading Plotline

In her book on beheadings in literature, LOSING OUR HEADS: BEHEADINGS IN LITERATURE AND CULTURE, Regina Jones (2005) identifies these four categories of beheading: Judicial; Sacrificial; Presentational; Trophy.

Judicial: Citing a Wahhabist interpretation of Islamic justice, SAUDI ARABIA beheads criminals it has found guilty of murder, drug trafficking, rape, burglary, witchcraft, and apostasy. The state of Saudi Arabia thereby symbolically and jurisprudentially legitimises ISIS beheadings. And we may wonder if the international community indirectly legitimises beheadings because it recognizes the legitimacy of Saudi Arabian state-conducted decapitation—JUDICIAL beheading.

Sacrificial: Borrowing legitimacy from Saudi Arabia, ISIS beheadings participate in all four beheading categories. However, ISIS beheadings begin as a form of RITUALISTIC murder. All ritual is a kind narrative that derives its meaning largely from sequence, doing things in the correct order at the correct moment, just as narrative creates meaning by having characters do things (events) through time.

ISIS beheadings begin as COMMUNAL BLOOD RITUALS. As with any ritual, the beheading ritual is performed to create cohesion and loyalty among ISIS members. The fear and outrage that beheading creates among non-ISIS onlookers often obscures the “group-building” aspect of the beheading narrative. Creating terror, however, is not the main goal of beheadings at this stage in the narrative plot. The social goal is to create group cohesion.[vii]

Beheading as communal blood ritual is also used as a rites of passage to initiate newcomers, to mark their identities as “timeless” Jihadis, to link them to an eternal, timeless, “sacred” space. Beheading as communal blood ritual cleanses European-born ISIS of “Westoxification.” That term (in Persian, Gharbzadegi) was first used by the Ayatollah Khomeni during the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) to mean “the state of being inebriated with Western culture and ideas.”[viii]

 ISIS beheadings represent a symbolic severing with Western ideals, beliefs, culture—the main source of the spiritual toxins that infect Islam, according to all-known varieties of modern Salafism. Beheading an infidel, the ISIS executioner symbolically cuts off his own “Western” head. He sacrifices an Infidel’s head to re-gain his Islamic identity.

Communal blood ritual inculpates ISIS members in the same crimes as their fellow Jihadis, a technique of coerced loyalty typically practiced by criminal gangs. Beheading represents a point of no “legal” return. Moreover, beheading as communal blood ritual transforms a ritual participant’s neuro-network/brain chemistry.  Beheading may embody a point of no psychological return as well.
My hypothesis:  As a communal blood ritual, beheading is a potently addictive psychotropic agent that radically and permanently alters the neurology of ritual participants. Corollary: The limbic system of ritual practitioners is permanently altered by the communal blood ritual of beheading.  We must account for this neurological transformation when assessing any ISIS defector’s claims about rejecting violence as a form of religious practice. [ix]

(When displayed on YOUTUBE, a beheading video can also act as a remote communal blood ritual.)
We need more information about who gets to perform beheadings within ISIS. Are beheadings “permitted” only to privileged members? Are ALL initiates required to attend beheadings?  Are women allowed to participate directly in this ritual?

Presentational: The beheading plotline enters the mediation stage when the beheading becomes PRESENTATIONAL, a sign of victory in the Jihad. Presenting the decapitation is an assertion of success on the battlefield, even as the presentation is also meant to create terror in infidels. According to the logic of magical thinking, the blood spilled during the beheading and presented to a remote audience has the power to cleanse all of Islam, starting with the Infidel-contaminated territory (i.e. Libya) onto which the beheading blood is directly spilled.

In this magical sense, the blood sacrifice presented and projected to a global Caliphate cleanses the mythic map of the greater Islamic Caliphate, which the ISIS Jihad purports to be re-conquering. When GPSed on today’s map, recent ISIS beheadings become a key part of ISIS mythic cartography, which corresponds to the imperial landmass of the Islamic Empire of Harun Al Rashid (ca. 800). Blood cleansing of the Salaf’s imagined Caliphate sets up the presentational use of the beheadings as a tool of recruitment, and the presentation of beheadings becomes a weapon in the Electronic Jihad (E-Jihad).

There’s a distinct aesthetic quality to ISIS beheading presentations. ISIS communicators clearly design beheading videos to maximize aesthetic pleasure for an ISIS audience, for example, making the executioners of the Coptic victims appear seven feet tall, as if they’re larger than life, like comic book and video game heroes.  In mediation, such as Youtube, ISIS beheadings provide remote ISIS members, ISIS sympathizers, or the ISIS-curious a source of voyeuristic pleasure.

As noted above, the beheading narrative borrows its aesthetic appeal from non-Islamic sources that have primed today’s youth to critically “appreciate” beheading, especially blood on swords. The blood-dripping beheading sword resonates not only with slasher films but also with popular “sword & blade” films like Lord of the Rings and with even more popular video games like SKYRIM and the METAL GEAR SERIES (i.e. REVENGANCE) that feature decapitation as a regular part of gameplay. Video games do not create terrorists.

My point is that decapitation had been implanted as a common feature of the cultural imaginary of game players and film goers long before ISIS began producing its version of Islamic snuff film. ISIS communicators exploit the decapitation pre-implantation of popular culture.

In its presentational mode, the beheading narrative announces victory on the battlefield, projects the blood cleansing of the ISIS mythic map (the global caliphate), and, with the aim of recruitment, exploits a pre-existing popular blood aesthetic in which the contemplation of beheading is source of pleasurable entertainment. ISIS recruits have likely been primed to become decapitators both by Islamic and by non-Islamic imagery of beheading.[x]  

Trophy: The beheading plotline is consummated when the severed heads are made into personal possessions by ISIS members, to increase their status and prestige among fellow Jihadists.  The heads become TROPHIES. They perform all of the typical cultural functions of other kinds of trophies. They mark the completion of a rites of passage.

Does the accumulation of heads, Colonel Kurtz style, increase status and prestige among ISIS members?

In sum, the ISIS beheading narrative begins at a primal, neuro-biological level, as a blood ritual meant to link ISIS members horizontally to each other, backward to an Islamic past of sword-driven imperial conquest, and vertically up into a timeless space of eternal Jihad. At the ritual stage, the narrative performs the primal evolutionary function of all narrative/ritual—to create group cohesion and loyalty. Specific to ISIS beheadings is how the “West-toxified” self of the ISIS member is sacrificed in order to gain or re-gain a purified Islamic identity. In cutting off the head of an infidel, the ISIS member heals himself of Occidentosis.

The communal blood ritual is then presented, via mediation, to a remote global audience, to signal victory in the Jihad and to project to the blood cleansing of the terra sancta of the caliphate. As a form of presentation, the beheading becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation (a source of pleasure) and a recruitment lure that exploits non-Islamic imagery of beheadings.

Finally, the severed heads become trophies used to increase prestige and status among ISIS members.
We need further investigation into the neuro-psychology of communal blood ritual.[xi] We also need to know the neurological implications of viewing blood rituals in mediation: To what bio-psychological extent does one participate in this ritual (experience the same neuro-peptide buzz) remotely, through the internet? We also need to contrast the beheading narrative/ritual to other, more pragmatic forms of ISIS violence.


End Notes
[i]    Jonathan Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behaviour, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015)
[ii]   For recondite but instructive discussions of Islamic law, see Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (London, 1998);  Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge, 1991); Ann Lambton “Changing Concepts of Justice and Injustice from the 5th Century to the 8th Century in Persia: The Saljuq Empire and the Ilkhanate” in Studia Islamica (volume 68, 1988) pp. 27-60; Wael Hallaq A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge, 1997); Franz Rosenthal, “Political Justice and the Just Ruler” in Israel Oriental Studies (volume 10, 1982) pp. 92-101. I owe these references to Gudrun Krämer, “Wettstreit der Werte: Anmerkungen zum zeitgenössischen islamischen Diskurs” in Die kulturellen Werte Europas edited by Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (Bonn: Bundes zentrale für politische Bildung, 2005) pp. 469 – 493.
[iii]    For an overview of Islamic history, see Efraim Karsh’s Islamic Empire: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
[iv]    Timothy Furnish, “Beheading in the Name of Islam” in The Middle East Quarterly, (12 (2), 51-57, 2005)
[v]    See Michael Bonner’s Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[vi]    For a comprehensive discussion of the evolutionary development of narrative as a social tool, see Brian Boyd’s On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
[vii]    Dawn Perlmutter,  “Mujahideen Blood Rituals: The Religious and Forensic Symbolism of Al Qeada Beheading” in Anthropoetics (11-2, 10-21, 2005) and Investigating Religious Terrorism and Ritualistic Crimes (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2003) and “Mujahideen Desecration: Beheadings, Mutilation & Muslim Iconoclasm” in Anthropoetics (12, 2, 1-8, 2006).
[viii]   Jonathan Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behaviour, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015)
[ix]   See Eugene G. d’Aquili, Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., John McManus, et al, The Spectrum of Ritual: A Biogenetic Structural Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Victor Turner, "Body, Brain, and Culture," in The Anthropology of Performance (New York: PAJ Publications, 1987). Ronald Grimes, Beginnings in Ritual Studies, Revised Edition (University of South Carolina Press, 1995). D’ Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999). Nathan Mitchell, "What Biogeneticists Are Saying About Ritual: A Report," Liturgy Digest, 1:1 (Spring 1993). Pascal Boyer Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits, and Ancestors (Wiedenfeld and Nicolson: London, 2001).
[x]    Combating Terrorism Center The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda, 2014.
[xi]    For accounts of the evolutionary development of ritual, see Pascal Boyer’s Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits, and Ancestors 2001 (New York: Basic Books) and Robin Dunbar’s The Human Story, 2004 (London: Faber & Faber).  For an early but still-useful look at the neurological basis of ritual, see Eugene D’Aquili’s The Spectrum of Ritual: A Biogenetic Analysis, 1979 (Columbia: Columbia University Press) and The Mystical Mind, 1999 (Fortress Press).

sábado, 2 de mayo de 2015

ISIS For The Common Man (by Keith Nightingale) (análisis)

Understanding ISIS is fairly simply, resolving it as a matter of National interest is a lot harder.  At present, an effective US policy for the elimination of ISIS and retention of a reasonably democratic Iraq is a riddle with the combined complexity of the Gordian Knot and an eight-sided Rubik’s Cube.  For those of you who are on long subway, bus or train commutes-Here is an ISIS Issues for Dummies.

WHAT IS THE ISSUE?

This is a religious issue between the Sunni’s and the Sh’ias on a large scale.  On a smaller one, ISIS is a Sunni based organization that has occupied significant parts of Iraq and Syria and is viewed as a terrorist organization by the West.  They would say they were religious purists acting in the name of their God as they interpret the Koran.  Others say they are just simple terrorists in a religious disguise who kill anyone who disagrees with their position.

WHAT IS ISIS?

ISIS is a Sunni outgrowth of the “Sunni Triangle” in Iraq-the home area for the late less than great Saddam Hussein.  It grew out of the disaffection the local Sunni population had with how the central Iraq Sh’ia-dominated government was denying them their rights and ruling with a very hard hand. 

When the US and Allied forces left Iraq due to, inter alia, the lack of interest by then Prime Minister Maliki-a Sh’ia-in signing a Status of Forces Agreement-our absence allowed Maliki to restructure his emerging democratic government into a traditional Sh’ia based one man band.  He purged all the competent Sunni military leadership and replaced them with mostly proven incompetent Sh’ia thereby significantly weakening the new army we had struggled so hard to build.  He trumped up charges against his Vice Premier, a Sunni, and chased him into the desert.  He created a local monolithic Sh’iadom with the tacit and sometimes overt support of Iran-the Sh’ia heartland as Saudi Arabia is the heartland for the Sunni.  The Sunni population of Iraq was disenfranchised and pretty much left to their own devices but at a distinct disadvantage compared to their Sh’ia bretheren.  From this condition, ISIS arose.

HOW DID THIS ALL GET STARTED?

Using the Wayback Machine, return to the end of WW I and the Treaty of Versailles.  One of the outgrowths was something called the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  This was a treaty between France and England that divided up the newly available Middle East in order to resolve mutual interests-primarily oil access.  The present day political boundaries of much of the Middle East were drawn by the treaty committees without regard to existing cultural and religious lines and we have been suffering the internal frictions ever since. 

The schism between Sunni and Sh’ia was ignored as was the Balfour Declaration granting the Jews a Home state and the inferred agreement between Britain and Faisal brokered by Lawrence where Faisal would rule most of the Moslem populations of the old Ottoman Empire less Turkey and Egypt.  In sum, Sykes-Picot has resulted in a very bad land deal.

Over time, the various brokered rulers managed their internal frictions with a somewhat iron hand.  Note that Saddam, a Sunni, controlled his majority Sh’ia population and gave everyone a bit of something in return for loyalty.  Maliki rejected that approach by essentially declaring the Sunni’s societal outcasts.  ISIS is a direct outgrowth of the disaffection.

HOW DOES ISIS MANIFEST ITSELF?

The heart of ISIS-land is the Iraqi Sunni population in the Tikrit Triangle-Saddam’s family base.  It spreads into portions of Syria and roughly resembles the 1848 Caliphate which encompassed those areas prior to Western political cartography.  ISIS governance is extremely well-organized with the infrastructure of a relatively mature nation.  It manages social services, revenue collection, security, military operations, religious management/interpretation and suicide elements.  It is a real government albeit religious-based-at least from the public view.

Its occupation is marked by strict Sharia law, taxation, impressment and expulsion of non-believers. People viewed as unwilling to provide 100% loyalty are either beheaded, otherwise executed or forced out.  Compromise and assimilation are not ISIS words.  Extreme purity of cause is stated as the basis for the style of occupation.

It has considerable wealth from a combination of Iraqi and Syrian oil, local taxation and revenues received from other Sunni elements-primarily Saudi Arabian.  It has a very sophisticated global social network engagement program which demonstrates considerable psychological and cultural awareness to attract foreign fighters and support from disaffected members of Western nations.  So far, they are credited with attracting more than 20,000 foreign personnel to the cause.  These newly available ISIS assets range from sex slaves to frontline fighters to suicide bombers-no one is more enthused about a cause than a recent convert.

HOW DOES THIS GET RESOLVED?

The best solution, from our Western perspective,  is that the Government of Iraq, retake ISIS-Land and reconstitute a government that includes Sunni assimilation into the mainstream of life.  Presently, this is not possible due to a combination of military ineptitude and lack of interest in Sunni assimilation.  The present PM of Iraq has pledged to resolve both issues but it will take time.  Meantime, how do we contain ISIS and prevent its/their leakage to other parts of the world?  At present, in this regard, we have failed utterly,  as shown in Libya, Tunesia and Egypt.

WHO ARE OUR FRIENDS AND OUR ENEMIES REGARDING RESOLUTION?

The countries that our logical friends, may not be for a variety of reasons.  The countries that we may consider enemies could be our friends but won’t be for a variety of reasons.  We would like to ally with both enemies and friends to focus on ISIS but can’t get there from here.  It’s a mess.  Reviewing our regional friends and enemies list we find…………..

IRAN

Because Iran is strongly supporting the Baghdad government against ISIS, one would assume Iran is an ally in being in our efforts to control/eliminate ISIS.  Not so.  Iran is the central religious focus of the Sh’ia branch, has strongly supported the Sh’ia majority within Iraq and was the mainstay of the Sadr Militia with which we had major combat issues in our tenure.  The Sh’ia’s are naturally aligned against the Sunni ISIS and have made the point whenever they re-occupy previous ISIS controlled Sunni populations to the detriment of long term assimilation.

Recall that Iran fought a major war with Saddam’s Iraq but that all was forgiven with Saddam’s demise and worked very hard to insure a Sh’ia-centric Iraq emerged regardless of US desires for a more mixed democracy.  Iran is also a strong supporter of the Assad regime in Syria-another Sh’ia based government the US desires to go away.

Iran is strongly supporting the Iraqi efforts against ISIS to include provision of its quality Qud Brigade and primary military commander, Gen Sulemani.  Sulemani has been officially declared a terrorist by the US.  Visualizing him working in close association with our in country Lt General is a stretch.

Concurrently, the US is mano a mano with Iran over nuclear proliferation.  It is going to be   extremely hard for the US to develop any support associated with Iran regarding Iraq with these issues extant.  Within Washington, Iran is viewed as perhaps our most significant problem in the region with its nuclear development program and potential to create a major confrontation with Israel.  Getting help or helping here is pretty doubtful.

KURDISTAN

Probably our strongest ally in the area and the one most engaged and successful against ISIS.  On the surface, we should be supporting them all the way as we did when Saddam was in power.  They know how to fight well and hate ISIS even though they are essentially Sunni-centric.

Problems……..because they are good and essentially independent from Baghdad, Baghdad does not want us to help them in any meaningful way that will assist their independence.  Ditto Turkey.

TURKEY

Turkey-ostensibly our strongest NATO ally in the conflicted zones, has officially requested we not provide any support to the Kurds-specifically arms, uniformed trainers or US military units in any form.  Turkey has been battling Kurdish factions for years and is adamant they not establish an independent nation.

Turkey also benefits financially from the now-ISIS exported oil from a portion of the petroleum crescent via the petroleum pipeline going from Iraq to the Mediterranean. The present government’s desire to weaken the Kurds as a priority issue severely limits any steps the US may wish in the northern region against ISIS.

SAUDI ARABIA

The Kingdom is the religious center of the Sunni religion.  It is also, ostensibly, our strongest and most consistent ally in the region.  Internally, this is a highly conflictive situation. To overtly counter ISIS, is to potentially destabilize the present royal line which is the greatest concern of both the Royals and ourselves.

Much of ISIS’ funds are derived from private Saudi sources and the largest single citizenry exporting itself to ISIS is Saudi.  In sum, like it or not, Saudi Arabia is ISIS strongest albeit private supporter of ISIS.

SYRIA

The Assad regime is a Sh’ia based government.  One third of the country has been occupied by ISIS and the inflicted government would seem a natural ally in the war against ISIS.  BUT……..we are on record to overthrown the Assad regime and have been supporting the rebel movement with varied assets ranging from intelligence to air strikes to covert operations.

Our rebel allies are predominately Sunni-based and include a healthy dose of Al Quaida-our sworn enemy in Iran and Afghanistan has somehow managed to be on our side in Syria.  Complicated world out there.    

JORDAN

The least wealthy and most vulnerable of our allies, is at present, our strongest ally in the anti-ISIS effort-in no small measure due to the public torching of its F16 pilot by ISIS.  In return for Jordanian support, the US has provided more than 1.2B$ in aid this year to the King.  They need it.

In return, the King has significantly engaged his air and ground forces on the Syrian border and within Syria.  He also houses and supports the largest group of Syrian refugees even though it could be potentially destabilizing.  His voice and presence is the bridge between the Western and Middle Eastern culture clashes.

There is only so much the King can do before running out of reserves.  Supporting the refugees-both Palestinian and Syrian is a major effort.  Assisting US interests with close integration of military assets consumes most internal resources and capabilities.  Going after ISIS within Iraq, is presently a bridge too far.

IRAQ

The elephant that owns the phone booth.  It was PM Maliki’s actions that created ISIS and its now PM al-Abadi’s task to fix what’s broken.  His problem is that to be truly effective in ISIS-Land, he needs to place a number of competent Sunni’s within the re-occupation government elements, the Iraqi military and the Iraqi governing bodies.  Further, he has to seriously build credibility with inclusion of Sunni interests within the fabric of the entire nation and society.  Presently, this is a slow process.

Whatever elements of the government manage to re-occupy ISIS-Land, they must engage the locals with a helping and supportive hand.  This has not yet been the case.  On the contrary, when Sh’ia-dominate government forces have secured ISIS areas, they have spent most of their time extracting their version of religious justice by killing Sunni’s and keeping them isolated from any benefits.  Until this changes, ISIS will continue to prosper and any efforts to support the Greater Iraq and our interests will be for naught.

OK-WHAT CAN WE DO?

Not a whole lot in a meaningful way without some help.  At present, we are conducting highly selective and possibly effective but not decisive air strikes from aircraft and drones.  To be really effective with air, we need people on the ground with intimate knowledge of immediate local targets.  That means either local Iraqi’s we have trained or our own people.

Placing US forces on the ground requires both an invitation from the Iraqi government as well as a signed Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA)-neither of which have been received yet. To place actual combat units requires all of the above and a lot more.

10,000 troops requires in excess of 50,000 support personnel to keep them fed and oiled with the machinery of war.  The US public as well as the White House has not indicated this is an acceptable option.

To imbed US advisors within the Iraqi structure requires the same invitation and SOFA plus rules that allow them to accompany their Iraqi counterparts and share the same risks-advisers that cannot accompany can observe and report but not be a credible improvement.

Presently, we have a US Lieutenant General and around a thousand personnel in a Baghdad compound training newer elements-including Sunni soldiers.  That may be as good as it gets.

We can hope/train/encourage non-US military to support the Iraqi government.  So far that means the Iranian military which we do not view favorably.

Ultimately, the best answer is a credible Iraqi military with Sunni and Sh’ia and an inclusive government that provides for Sunni interests.  Some assembly and a lot of time required.

IN SUM

In the region, our enemies ought to be our friends.  Our friends are often our enemies due to local circumstances and very little is simple.  To engage is one thing.  To effectively engage is quite another.

You may now work the Sudoku puzzle.  It will be more rewarding.